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Cartels – agreements between competitors to fix prices, allocate customers, 
and/or limit output – harm consumers. Cartel members raise their profits by, in 
effect, imposing a small, but nonetheless illegal, per unit ‘tax’ on consumers. 
Combating cartels requires not only detection and prosecution, but also the 
imposition of proportionate sentences. 
 
In Ireland a judge has a wide degree of discretion in sentencing in cartel cases. 
There are no minimum statutory sentences, only maximum. These have increased 
overtime. For example, an individual on indictment could be sentenced to a 
maximum of two years in jail under 1996 competition legislation, but by 2012 the 
maximum had risen to 10 years. The legislation does not provide guidance which 
might fetter the Court. There are no sentencing guidelines for cartel offences as 
exist in, for example, the United States and European Union. 
 
How then does the Court determine the sentence is a cartel case? The obvious 
place to look is the Court’s judgment. However, despite 33 convictions of 
individuals and firms involved in cartels in home heating oil, Ford cars, and 
Citroen motor vehicles, there is only one publicly available judgment, Director of 
Public Prosecutions v Patrick Duffy and Duffy Motors (DPP v Duffy) plus the 
transcript of the sentencing in DPP v Hegarty.  
 
Judges often rely on earlier cases for guidance in a current case. In DPP v Duffy 
the Court relies on an English judgment, R. v Whittle, Alison and Brammar (R. v 
Whittle), for guidance as to the correct approach to sentencing. At first glance 
this seems a sensible approach, since R v Whittle is a criminal cartel case.  
However, the Court in R v Whittle states that it is not to be relied upon as 
providing a set of sentencing guidelines. Whittle and his co-defendants had 
already entered into plea agreements with the US antitrust authorities and the 
issue was whether or not the English Court would impose higher prison sentences 
than those already agreed. 
 
2 
Nevertheless, in R v Whittle reference is made to six plainly relevant factors that 
should be taken into account in sentencing in a cartel case: the gravity and nature 
of the offences; the duration of the offences; the degree of culpability of the 
defendant in implementing the cartel agreement; the degree of culpability of the 
defendant in enforcing the cartel agreement; whether the defendants conduct 
was contrary to any Company Compliance Manual; and, mitigating factors such as 
whether or not the defendant had been compelled to participate in the cartel. 
The Court in DPP v Duffy does not go through these six factors and then link the 
assessment of each factor in a systematic manner to the sentence. This is not to 
deny that each of the factors, bar one, is discussed and that the Court provides a 
detailed examination of the defendant’s arguments in mitigation. 
 
There are several benchmarks that could be used to determine the appropriate 
sentence. Here we confine our attention to benchmarks in relation to Duffy 
Motors, the firm that was convicted.1 
 
• At a minimum, it could be argued, any fine imposed on a firm convicted for 
participating in a cartel should equal the gains from the cartel activity i.e. 
raising prices to consumers.2 Such an approach is consistent with the Irish 
Supreme Court’s view that the “entire aim and object of competition law is 
consumer welfare.” We assume that the cartel to which Duffy Motors 
belonged was able to raise the price of Citroen motor vehicles in Leinster by 
10 per cent for the duration of the cartel. 
• An alternative approach to setting the benchmark is to consider the gravity of 
the offence and any mitigating factors in relation to the statutory maximum. 
The Court in DPP v Duffy characterised the breach of competition law as 
serious and was not impressed with the mitigating arguments of the 
defendants. This suggests a sentence towards the upper end of the maximum 
 
 
 
1  In the DPP v Duffy Motors both an individual and a firm were convicted and sentenced. 
2  If account of the fact the probability of being caught and successfully prosecuted is less than one, then the fine would 
be greater than the additional profits generated by the cartel. 
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under the legislation relevant for R v Duffy: 10 per cent of sales or €3.81 
million, whichever was the greater.  
 
Using these benchmarks, it is clear from Table 1 that the €50,000 fine actually 
imposed on Duffy Motors by the Court was small compared to the benchmarks in 
the legislation (1.3 or 5.4 per cent) and an approximation of the additional profits 
garnered by Duffy Motors (1.1 per cent). 
 
TABLE 1 
Benchmarking Fines, DPP v Duffy, Duffy Motors(Newbridge) Ltd t/a P. G. Duffy and Sons 
Benchmark €50,000 fine as per cent of benchmark 
10 per cent of sales of Duffy Motors in the year prior to 
conviction or €927,000 
5.4 per cent 
€3.81 million 1.3 per cent 
Cartel overcharge or €4.64 million 1.1 per cent 
 
One reason for the small fine was that two other members of the Citroen cartel 
had already been convicted and sentenced prior to Duffy Motors. The Court felt, 
on grounds of horizontal equity, it had to impose comparable fines on Duffy 
Motors. Two points can be made in this regard. First, neither of the earlier 
judgements was in the public domain so it was not possible for the Court in Duffy 
Motors to determine on what basis these earlier fines were imposed and their 
relevance, if any, to the sentencing of Duffy Motors. Second, although horizontal 
equity may have merited a fine of €50,000, this does not take away from the 
point that the Court could have developed what the correct fine should have 
been, since the Court was clearly minded, had it been able to do so, to impose a 
higher sentence than €50,000. 
 
Of course, it is easy to criticise the lack of sentencing guidelines that emanate 
from the Duffy judgment. Developing such guidelines is likely to be neither easy 
nor straightforward. There is a tension between too much predictability and too 
much fettering of the discretion of the Courts. Just as too much judicial discretion 
without the need to carefully reason why a particular sentence is imposed can 
lead to sloppy thinking, injustice, and lack of accountability, equally an excessively 
prescriptive set of guidelines can lead to injustice. The challenge is to get the 
balance between the two extremes correct, so that the sentencing guidelines or 
methodology provides a reasonably acceptable framework within which 
sentences are determined while at the same leaving the Court sufficient flexibility 
to reflect the facts of the case.  
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The Court in the DPP v Duffy drew on – although it is not clear it applied – the not 
altogether relevant precedent of R v Whittle. Instead the Court could have drawn 
upon US guidance in determining the appropriate sentence. US cartel law is much 
more similar to Irish than either that of the UK or the EU. US sentencing guidance 
in cartel cases are set out in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual (the 
Sentencing Guidelines). These are evidence based and incorporate the factors 
mentioned in R v Whittle as being relevant to sentencing. The application of the 
Sentencing Guidelines provides a methodology that determines, given the facts 
of the case, a range of fines and/or imprisonment. However, at the same time the 
Sentencing Guidelines do not remove judicial discretion, since they are advisory 
and the Court can go outside the range suggested by the Sentencing Guidelines, 
provided that the reasons are carefully set out by the Court.   
 
In sum, Courts in Ireland have wide discretion in imposing sentences in cartel 
cases. The sentences imposed by the Courts are – based on DPP v Duffy Motors – 
far too low, resulting in serious under enforcement. Consumers pay the cost in 
terms of higher prices, while cartelists reap the benefits as individuals in terms of 
higher executive pay, as owners in terms of higher share prices and higher 
dividends. There needs to be greater transparency both in terms of publication of 
Court judgments, but also for those judgments, perhaps assisted by sentencing 
guidelines, setting out the methodology that underpins the sentence imposed.  
That way we would know whether or not the punishment fits the crime. 
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